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In the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis replaced 
America’s ally, the Shah, with an Islamic Republic that, to the present day, poses a 
threat to American interests in the Middle East.  The two aforementioned events 
left searing images in the minds of Americans and signaled the beginning of 
America’s global struggle against Islamic extremists.  The individual who is often 
blamed for this “loss” of Iran is former president Jimmy Carter.  Because the crises 
in Iran occurred while Carter was in office, many critics have come to the 
conclusion that Carter was a “weak and indecisive” president.1  By examining 
outcomes alone, they appeared to be correct.  Although Carter publicly professed 
the desire to change America’s role in international relations, his foreign policy 
was not particularly distinctive from his Cold War predecessors in practice, and 
many critics believe that his unwavering commitment to the Shah helped bring 
upon the revolution.  However, outcomes alone do not tell the whole story.  As 
president, Carter was not blindly idealistic or loyal to the Shah or to the Iranian 
government, and his policies were not solely responsible for “losing” Iran.  In 
order to pass judgments on the quality of Carter’s foreign policy, historians and 
critics must first carefully research the origins of individual policies in order to 
determine why Carter chose the particular courses of action that he did, and what 
other alternatives might have been available. 
A foreign policy initiative of Carter’s that has especially been misunderstood 
was his global human rights policy.  Like much of the administration’s foreign 
policy, its intentions were to set a new moralistic course in international relations 
and to move America away from outdated Cold War ideologies.2  However, 
Carter’s inconsistent implementation of the policy has led most historians to 
disregard its importance.  Because Carter appeared to defer to the foreign policies 
of previous Cold War presidents, the issues of human rights and an American 
foreign policy infused with morals appeared to be little more than shrewd political 
rhetoric.  In terms of Iran, and like most other Cold War foreign policy makers, 
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Carter was reluctant to pursue a drastic new course.  For many years, the Shah had 
been effective at providing a certain level of stability to the Middle East, and 
Carter did not want to be remembered as the president who upset this delicate 
balance.  Consequently, the issue of human rights would become the wildcard of 
Carter’s term in office.  The new and strikingly liberal policy would embolden 
Iran’s intellectual opposition and raised the world’s hope in American 
humanitarianism, but it would also place Carter in a vulnerable political position.  
As biographer Robert Strong writes, “Carter tried to deal with human rights in a 
serious fashion without ignoring other foreign policy goals.”3  This gave the 
appearance that Carter was trying to have it all ways, and in the process he would 
satisfy no one. 
This essay will demonstrate what effects Carter’s human rights policy had on 
the Iranian Revolution and Carter’s presidency.  In particular, my analysis will 
focus on the first two years of Carter’s term, when human rights were especially a 
priority in his foreign policy and when Iran’s various opposition movements 
experienced resurgences.  Before examining Carter’s human rights policy in 
relation to Iran, I will first examine the ideological constructions of the policy to 
determine Carter’s motives for advocating human rights and why Carter placed it 
so high on his foreign policy agenda.  Following this, and through the use of 
declassified government documents, the Carter administration’s inconsistencies 
will be explored in order to determine how the application of the administration’s 
human rights policy affected internal events in Iran.  Particular focus will be given 
to the Iranian opposition movements and how Carter’s promise of human rights 
affected the nature of their protests.  This essay does not absolve Carter or his 
policies from responsibility, like many of his biographers have done.  Nor does it 
contend that Carter was solely to blame for the unfavorable events that occurred in 
Iran, like many of his sharpest critics have claimed.  What this essay argues is that 
during the first half of Carter’s presidency, the policy of human rights gave his 
administration an opportunity to change America’s relations with Iran and to cut 
ties with the Shah.  More than anything, this essay may be viewed as a case study 
of how the Carter administration’s human rights policy was applied in countries 
and regions where great American interests were at stake.  From this point, it can 
be determined how the Carter administration formulated and practiced its foreign 
policy in Iran, the reasons Carter chose to maintain his support for the Shah, how 
Carter’s support of the Shah affected Iran’s internal struggles, and how the policy 
of human rights continues to obscure his legacy as a foreign policy maker. 
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The idea of a foreign policy framed around human rights publicly emerged first 
in 1976 as part of the Democratic Party’s election platform.4  It was conceived by 
Carter and other Democrats as a way for America to return to its “fundamental 
liberal principles that all too often had been ignored or even ridiculed by cold war 
foreign policy professionals.”5  According to Carter, American foreign policy had 
been promoting repression instead of progress.6  A year before the election, Carter 
had expressed concern in his autobiography, titled Why Not the Best, that the U.S. 
had fallen away from morality in its foreign policy.7  In Carter’s eyes, recent 
foreign policy makers, notably Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, had promoted 
a policy that defended American interests at the price of disregarding morality and 
America’s duty to uphold a high standard in the world.8  This doctrine of 
“realpolitik” was first implemented in the U.S. by America’s original “Cold 
Warriors,” such as George Kennan, and had been applied by many American 
leaders throughout the Cold War.9  It stated that the U.S. must set aside its 
moralistic policies and instead pursue a careful, pragmatic, and realistic foreign 
policy.  A foreign policy crafted around morals and idealism, according to the 
doctrine, only agitated nationalism and communism in the third world, and would 
lead to more violence and upheaval, thus compromising American interests 
abroad.10  However, Carter believed it was unnecessary for American foreign 
policy makers to choose between morality and interests; both could be achieved if 
the overall moral standard in the world was raised.  Carter believed it was the duty 
of American leaders to construct a foreign policy “rooted in our values” that could 
properly “serve mankind”.11  In addition, Carter and the Democrats believed 
America’s realpolitik was playing directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.  
According to this thinking, the U.S. was in no position to call attention to the 
“deplorable repression” sponsored by the Soviets, since the U.S. itself was 
supporting authoritarian dictators for the sake of its interests.12  To Carter, the lack 
of morality in foreign policy exemplified a broader trend of amoral American 
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policy that culminated in the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation.13  By 
reinstituting morality at home and abroad through the promotion of global human 
rights, Carter believed he could restore the standing of America’s political 
institutions, both in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of the American people. 
Politically, Carter’s human rights policy was perceived as being a “no lose 
issue”.14  According to Carter’s speech writer during the 1976 campaign, “liberals 
liked human rights because it involved political freedom” and an end to America’s 
support of dictatorships, while “conservatives liked it because it involved 
criticisms of Russia.”15  In addition, even though the American public may have 
disapproved of the tactics employed by Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, they 
did not widely disapprove of the results.16  Carter rightly sensed that the public did 
not want to sail too far off the foreign policy course set by the Republicans.  
However, promoting continuity would not win Carter an election.17  By advocating 
for human rights, Carter could set himself apart from the Republicans without 
appearing to be too radical.  Beyond bipartisanism, human rights were perceived as 
the glue that could hold the Democratic Party together, which had been bitterly 
divided in the previous two election losses.18   In the mid-1970s, the general public 
continued to hold Democrats responsible for the escalation of the Vietnam War 
under President Lyndon Johnson.19  Therefore, the promotion of global human 
rights and policies that distanced the Democrats from the Cold War era could help 
them escape their damaging legacy of the 1960s.   
However, the motives behind Carter’s desire to restore morality and promote 
global human rights went much deeper than politics.  His personal experiences as a 
southerner growing up in Georgia influenced his future decisions as a foreign 
policy maker.20  Carter’s Christian background and his mother’s atypical beliefs 
heavily affected the mindset of the budding politician.  Young Jimmy had been an 
anomaly in the American segregated south because he spent a considerable amount 
of time interacting with African Americans as a child.21  In addition, his mother 
had participated in the Peace Corps in India and believed very strongly in 
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desegregation.22  These experiences and ingrained beliefs would profoundly affect 
Carter’s mindset towards race relations and human rights for all people.  When 
Carter served as a member of a local school board as a young man, he refused to 
join the White Citizens’ Council that strongly opposed integration in public 
schools.23  Although he did not always publicize his beliefs for fear of political 
backlash, Carter’s human rights policy was derived from an upbringing in which 
he witnessed the dilemmas of an unequal society first hand.  As president, Carter 
would draw upon these experiences as he attempted to bring human rights and 
equality to the political limelight. 
Carter entered the Oval Office in January of 1977 believing that the Cold War 
had neared its conclusion, and that the traditional fight against the Soviet Union 
and communism had become outdated.24  In recent years, Nixon and Kissinger’s 
foreign policy, no matter how morally bankrupt, had brought about a détente 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the Cold War seemed to be burning 
itself out.  As historian H.W. Brands remarks, Carter “strove manfully to refashion 
the national interest to suit the new post-Cold War era.”25  New methods and 
ideologies had to be implemented in order for America to restore its standing in the 
world and make amends for its ill-conceived war in Vietnam.  As Carter stated, an 
“inordinate fear of communism” drove American foreign policy makers to “fight 
fire with fire” in areas of the world that otherwise were unimportant to the U.S.  
The “tragic experience of Vietnam”, according to Carter, had shown Americans 
that “fire is better quenched with water”.26  Although it would soon be proven that 
the Cold War was far from being over, a “soft” foreign policy promoting human 
rights initially appeared to be the solution for the new global picture that Carter 
envisioned.   
In his inaugural address, Carter stressed that America’s “commitment to human 
rights must be absolute.”27  In the early weeks and months of 1977, Carter, along 
with several key members of his administration, set out to articulate what exactly 
he meant by “human rights”.28  Although there were other key elements to Carter’s 
foreign policy—such as scaling back armaments and nuclear weapons, improving 
relations with America’s allies, and assisting developing nations—human rights, at 
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least publicly, was the administration’s top priority.29  In a speech delivered by the 
new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in April 1977, Vance explained that all 
persons of the world possessed the “right to be free from governmental violation of 
the integrity of the person.”30  This meant that America must treat harshly those 
governments who sponsored “torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”  In addition, Vance stated that 
“civil and political liberties” must be upheld, and that “vital needs,” such as “food, 
shelter, health care, and education,” must be ensured for all citizens.  It appeared as 
though the Carter administration would grant no exceptions to human rights 
violators.  In terms of the Shah of Iran, the administration privately expressed 
concern in classified correspondence that their traditional ally was exercising 
“unsatisfactory” human rights practices.31  Although not known at the time, the 
way in which Carter chose to address these practices in Iran would turn out to be 
the major foreign policy issue of his presidency. 
In order to enforce the human rights policy, the Carter administration realized 
that clear consequences had to be established for violating nations.  The leverage 
for this was American humanitarian aid and financial assistance.  To ensure that 
nations were in compliance with the human rights standards set by the 
administration, as well those of the UN and Amnesty International, the Carter 
administration dangled the carrot of the American dollar.32  As Carter stated early 
in his presidency:  
 
In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance program, we 
will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit 
themselves to a democratic path to development.  Towards regimes which 
persist in wholesale violations of human rights we will not hesitate to 
convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected.33  
 
Many of the regimes in question, including the Shah’s government in Iran, 
relied on American financial and military support for survival.  By stating that 
human rights violators would no longer be American aid recipients, the Carter 
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administration was hoping to force nations into compliance.  The nations that did 
comply were supposed to receive considerable amounts of humanitarian and 
economic assistance.  Since many of the nations in question were poor and 
politically unorganized, they were also extremely dependent on American 
assistance.  Carter believed that not receiving American aid was a choice most 
countries would not dare to make.   
However, some nations would challenge Carter’s resolve.  The policy’s greatest 
test would come in countries where the U.S. possessed historic mutual interest-
based relationships.  The clearest example of this in the 1970s was Iran.  For years, 
American leaders had maintained a delicate relationship with Iran’s government 
under the Shah.  In 1953 the CIA covertly participated in a coup in which “the 
pluralistic regime of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq” was overthrown and 
replaced with the Shah.34  The Shah, or Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was descended 
from a family dynasty that had long claimed authority as the historic rulers of 
Iran.35  The close relationship the Pahlavi dynasty shared with Great Britain and 
the United States encouraged the CIA to reinstall the Shah to power.  The fear of 
Soviet expansionism, combined with Iran’s geographic position on the Soviet 
Union’s southern border, aroused enough fears in Washington to plot a 
replacement to Mosaddeq’s government.  Also, the “loss” of China in 1949 and the 
war in Korea beginning in 1950 heightened concerns that other nations in Asia and 
the Middle East would quickly succumb to communism.36  Additionally, an 
unfriendly Iranian government could have devastating consequences for Western 
economies heavily reliant on imported Iranian oil.37  The end result of the coup 
was a puppet regime in Iran, and the Shah legitimized his government through 
authoritarianism and repression.38  A mutual alliance was established in which the 
U.S. and Iran defended one another’s interests.  The U.S., through the Shah, could 
contain communism and ensure access to Iran’s oil, and the Shah could maintain 
authority and power in Iran through U.S. military aid and technical assistance.  In 
1955 the Shah even signed his country into the Baghdad Pact, which stated that its 
purpose was “the containment of the Soviet Union” in the region’s affairs.39   
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As much as the Shah was favorable to the interests of the U.S., he was equally 
as detrimental towards the humanitarian situation in his own country.  Even amidst 
the Shah’s many reforms, the underclass of Iranian society showed little upward 
mobility.40  In addition, the civil rights and political freedoms in Iran under the 
Shah were generally regarded as deplorable.  Although the middle class in Iranian 
society grew steadily, the extent to which Iranians could conduct collective 
political action was extremely limited.  The historic liberal opposition to the Shah, 
the National Front, was almost completely shut out of the political process.41  The 
Iranian secret police, SAVAK, would arrest political opponents without cause, 
imprison them, and sentence them without trial.42  Traditional political uprisings 
and protests through the media were also ruthlessly suppressed.  This environment 
created a climate of fear that helped to secure the Shah’s power.  Much of the 
technical apparatuses that SAVAK used to gather intelligence and repress political 
opponents of the Shah were supplied by the U.S.43  As the Shah’s power waned in 
1970s, SAVAK became increasingly violent; assassinations, bombings, staged 
fires, and torture were all used to discourage Iranians from acting in opposition to 
the Shah.  This led Amnesty International to declare in 1975 that “no country in the 
world has a worse record in human rights than Iran.”44  For many years, the Shah 
got away with brutal governing tactics because the U.S. supported his regime.  
However, by 1977, this era appeared to be coming to an end as Carter’s human 
rights policy spoke directly to the type of humanitarian and civil rights violations 
that the Shah had relied on for years to maintain authority.   
In the early months of his presidency, Carter did not publicly address the Shah’s 
human rights violations, saving his concerns for private conversations.  Carter 
realized that he had to choose his public pronouncements carefully, lest he 
jeopardize American’s considerable interests in Iran.  As a confidential State 
Department memo explained, “A frontal attack by the United States government 
on the human rights situation in Iran will backfire.”45  However, the Shah took 
notice that Carter was dissimilar in many ways to most other Cold War-era 
presidents.  Carter’s vow to promote human rights in every corner of the globe 
signaled to the Shah that his special relationship with the U.S. might be affected.  
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The first major sign of this change was the decision to restructure arms sales to 
Tehran.46  To help ensure that his government’s relationship with the U.S. did not 
wane, the Shah began to relax restrictions against political protesters in the spring 
of 1977.47  Iran’s liberal nationalists took this as an opportunity to “start their 
campaign against repression.”48  In June of 1977, three members of Iran’s liberal 
movement published a short letter demanding “the respect of constitutionalism and 
human rights.”49  In addition, the newly revived Iranian intellectual circle known 
as the “Writers Association” published a similar letter signed by forty members 
later in the month.  As one of the signers of the second letter stated, “The 
government wouldn’t dare jail us in the present climate on human rights.”50  Many 
liberal opposition groups began to meet regularly and publicly.  SAVAK and other 
security forces were arresting fewer protestors and were employing less violent 
tactics than in previous years.51  The relaxation of repression due to Carter’s 
human rights policy allowed the liberal opposition a chance to grow and flourish.  
The members of these groups varied in occupation and ranged from doctors and 
lawyers to writers, intellectuals, and other professionals.52  The common goal of 
these groups was to force the Shah to put an end to his despotic practices and 
uphold Iran’s 1906 Constitution.53   
In addition to relaxing repression and allowing for some measures of peaceful 
protest, the Shah also responded to the Carter administration’s private pressures 
that International Red Cross volunteers be allowed to inspect Iran’s human rights 
situation.54  In the summer of 1977, as the Shah allowed the Red Cross access to 
Iranian prisons and Iranian courts, the Carter administration began to take notice.55  
As a confidential memo stated in the summer of 1977, the Carter administration 
was pleased by the Shah’s “recent significantly more open approach to human 
rights matters.”56  Another state department official also noted that the Shah had 
made “significant and important developments in the field of human rights” that 
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year.57  It was clear that the Shah was at least trying to meet the human rights 
principles that Vance articulated in his April speech.  Because of this, Carter’s 
relationship with the Shah began to improve by the fall of 1977.  The 
administration believed that the Shah was moving in a liberal direction and Carter 
believed that it was safe to work out a new arms deal with Tehran.58  Of course, the 
Shah’s reforms were largely for show, as he desperately tried to avoid falling out 
of Washington’s favor.  In the same vein, Carter granted the Shah a great deal of 
leniency because of the unique relationship between the two nations.  As a 
classified memo titled “Human Rights Goals – Iran” stated in the first part of 1978, 
“U.S. interests in Iran must be seen against a complex set of factors,” which 
included “the unusually broad and valuable relationship between the two 
countries” and “Iran’s ancient tradition of authoritarian government.”59  By 
framing the relationship with Iran in this context, the Carter administration enabled 
the Shah to view his relationship with Washington as purely interest-based and not 
pursuant on Iran’s commitment to human rights.  The Carter administration also 
intentionally refrained from keeping human rights-related data on Iran in order to 
put off having to take action against Tehran.60  The Shah would not have to 
democratize, as long as he was saving political face by meeting Carter’s minimum 
human rights guidelines and was protecting American interests in the region.  This 
type of relationship would spell trouble for both leaders in the second half of 
Carter’s term. 
The warming of relations between Carter and the Shah allowed both leaders to 
go ahead with the Shah’s scheduled year-end visit to Washington in November of 
1977.  Amidst a barrage of protest outside the White House, the two leaders met 
inside for talks that mainly focused on oil, weapons deals, and the economic issues 
of the world.61  The Shah’s human rights practices were touched upon but were in 
no way the main focus of the talks.  This agenda was hardly in line with Carter’s 
public pronouncement that human rights were his administration’s top foreign 
policy priority.  Following the November talks, the White House released a 
statement to the press indicating that “the two men had reviewed the positive steps 
Iran was taking on the matter of human rights.”62  A secret State Department paper 
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addressed to Carter stated that “the Shah left Washington ‘profoundly satisfied’ 
with the results of his talks with you” and that he was equally “gratified by your 
strong reiteration of the special relationship with his country.”63  This illustrates 
how the president and the Shah were mutually relieved that human rights had not 
gotten in the way of seemingly more important matters, such as oil prices. 
Much of the same sentiments were expressed during Carter’s New Year’s visit 
to Tehran.  In preparation for the trip, the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, addressed a memo to Carter outlining five imperative American 
foreign policy objectives relating to Iran that Carter was encouraged to pursue in 
his talks with the Shah.64  They included energy and oil concerns, nuclear 
cooperation, and Middle East stability.  Christopher’s last listed objective was 
human rights concerns, and only as they related to maintaining Iranian law and 
order.  The low priority given to human rights would continue during the actual 
visit.  Even as Iran’s human rights situation was once again deteriorating in the last 
three months of 1977, Carter was encouraged by State Department officials not to 
pressure the Shah on the issue for fear that the Shah would not “prefer it”.65  The 
toughest action Carter was urged to take in regards to human rights in Iran was to 
“encourage the Shah to continue the positive course” established in the spring and 
early summer of 1977.66  During the New Year’s talks, Carter gently broached the 
subject of human rights and was once again reassured by the Shah that his regime 
was very much concerned with human rights for all of its citizens.  This appeared 
to be good enough for Carter, because on New Year’s Eve, he would deliver the 
greatest praise for the Shah of his presidency.  At a state dinner that night, Carter 
toasted the Shah by claiming that “Iran, because of great leadership, is an island of 
stability.”  Carter continued by stating that the Iranian people loved and admired 
their leader, and that a “remarkable” transformation had taken place in Iran due to 
the Shah’s great “wisdom,” “judgment,” and “sensitivity.”67  Although some of 
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Carter’s hyperbole must be understood in the context of the festive environment, 
his toast cannot fully be dismissed because it did represent the administration’s 
reinforcement of its commitment to the Shah. 
The friendly manner of the Carter-Shah meetings in November and the new 
year encouraged the Shah to believe that his relationship with Washington was 
solidly intact.  This allowed the Shah to once again disregard human rights in Iran 
since he had little fear of reprisal from his lifeline, the United States.  Crackdowns 
on liberal opposition groups by the police and SAVAK intensified in the winter 
months of 1977, including those on opposition meetings and peaceful protests.68  
The correlation between the Carter-Shah meetings and an increase in government-
sponsored repression appears high.  Beating, arrests, and covert violent attacks 
against “freedom seekers” all increased as 1977 came to a close.69  The Muslim 
wing of opposition fared even worse.  SAVAK launched a campaign in the late 
months of 1977 and the early months of 1978 to eliminate the leaders of 
“clandestine guerrilla groups.”70
However, by the middle of 1978 it became clear that the Shah’s strategy had 
backfired, as the many resistance factions began to join together in order to 
achieve the common goal of ousting the Shah.71  The Shah’s violent tactics 
especially encouraged the poor masses of Iran’s urban centers to join the emerging 
Islamic movement.  State sponsored repression had encouraged many Iranians to 
collectively rally around their religious institutions located in large urban areas.  
Demographically, Iran had transformed from a rural nation into an urban one with 
fifty percent of the total population residing in towns or cities by the late 1970s.72  
This dense concentration of population “provided the occasion for substantial 
displays of mass protest” that would not have been possible years before.73  It also 
allowed the Islamic movement to preach its simple message to Iran’s large 
population of poor Muslims—that the Shah was degrading “Islamic standards of 
behavior and belief” and thus had to be replaced.74  Religion, according to some 
historians, was “the most efficient vehicle for channeling the revolutionary mood” 
                                                 
68 Kurzman, 20-21. 
69 Kurzman, 20-21. 
70 Ladeen and Lewis, 99. 
71 For a comparative evaluation of the secular liberal opposition and the religious Muslim 
movements in Iran, see Ladeen and Lewis, chapter 4; Kurzman, chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
72 For a brief explanation of how Iran’s changing demographics affected the nature of the Iranian 
revolution, see Fred Halliday, “The Genesis of the Iranian Revolution,” Third World Quarterly 1 
(Oct. 1979):13-15. 
73 Halliday, 14. 
74 Ladeen and Lewis, 105. 
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among the masses.75  The liberal opposition did not possess this advantage, as they 
preached reform messages that most of Iran’s Muslim citizens could not relate to 
their own circumstances.  The outcome in 1978 was that Iran’s liberal movement 
weakened while the Islamic movement gained strength.76  The result for Carter 
was a nightmarish scenario, as his “island of stability” was about to become 
anything but.   
Although the liberal opponents of the Shah were not fond of America’s historic 
intervention in Iranian affairs, their yearnings for a liberal and democratic society 
matched up well with Carter’s human rights policy and America’s founding 
principles.  In contrast, the radical Islamic movement expressed no desire to 
modernize Iran or embrace liberal reforms.77  As the Shah continued to waver on 
human rights, and as the religious movement gained strength, the question over 
why Carter was not able to shift course and endorse Iran’s moderate liberal 
reformers remains.  As explained earlier, liberal nationalists originally considered 
Carter’s human rights policy to be an opportunity for mobilization.  The tactics of 
these liberal opposition groups were almost completely non-violent, and its 
members consisted of professional and intellectual citizens.  They professed their 
displeasure by writing pamphlets, demonstrating in small groups, and publishing 
newspapers.78  This non-violent civil disobedience should have appealed to a man 
like Carter, whose own personal experiences included a southern upbringing in the 
midst of the American civil rights movement.  The liberal opposition of Iran gave 
Carter an opportunity to fully implement his human rights policy and support a 
much needed and peaceful regime change in Iran.  The public principles of 
Carter’s human rights policy, as stated by Vance in April of 1977, were very much 
consistent with the demands of Iran’s liberal opposition.  However, these reasons 
were not enough for Carter to terminate his relationship with the Shah.  The Shah 
may have been a world class human rights violator, but he had been the safe option 
for many years.  Carter, like his predecessors, was reluctant to give up on 
America’s friend and ally. 
Both Carter and the Shah were caught off guard in the latter part of 1978 when 
protests in Iran began to bolster popular resentment.79  One of the reasons for this 
                                                 
75 Gholam R. Afkhami, The Iranian Revolution: Thantos on a National Scale (Washington, D.C., 
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was the reliance of Carter and the Shah on SAVAK intelligence briefings.  
Because the U.S. Foreign Service, including the CIA, did not collect data on Iran 
in order to hide human rights violations, SAVAK became the eyes and ears for the 
conditions on the ground.80  The reason for the lack of U.S.-produced intelligence 
is because Carter remained adamant in allowing the Shah to work out his internal 
problems without covert or direct American interference.81  However, this stance 
led to flawed intelligence that only told the Shah what he wanted to hear, which in 
turn misled American foreign policy makers as well.  As an intelligence briefing 
summarized from September 1978: “the Shah is expected to remain actively in 
power over the next ten years.”82  In disgust over such a misevaluation, a member 
of the U.S. House of Representatives would later state in a study on Iranian 
intelligence that “no reports based on contacts with the religious opposition had 
appeared” before late 1977, and that “there was absolutely no reporting on the 
internal situation during the first quarter of 1978.”83  Carter’s inaction on Iranian 
matters was directly connected to the misleading intelligence reports he received, 
which led him to believe that the Shah had accepted the message of promoting 
human rights and that political opposition in Iran was still moderate and peaceful 
in nature.  In addition, these reports encouraged the perception that the Shah’s 
power was firm.  However, as 1978 came to an end, this fallacy began to reveal 
itself.  As far back as January 1977, before Carter’s inauguration, the State 
Department produced a policy paper stating that a “smooth transfer of power” in 
Iran was unlikely after the fall or death of the Shah because of Tehran’s reliance on 
“one man” leadership.84  The fact that Carter knew this but did not take steps to 
line up a proper successor in Iran shows that he had been misinformed of the real 
political situation.  Even Carter, whose close personal ties to the Shah have been 
well documented, would likely have withdrawn his support earlier if he was aware 
that the Shah’s government was on the brink of collapse.   
However, by the end of 1978, even misleading intelligence reports could not 
mask the truth.  Protests were increasingly turning into violent unrest, and the 
Shah’s security forces became reluctant to use force to suppress them.85  Amidst 
this turmoil, Carter finally began to publicly distance himself from the Shah.  In 
                                                 
80 For an explanation of American intelligence failures in relation to the Iranian Revolution, see 
Zonis, chapter 10. 
81 Zonis, 266. 
82 Zonis, 268. 
83 Zonis, 265. 
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December 1978, he stated that although his administration would “prefer the Shah 
to maintain a major role in the government,” it was “in the hands of the Iranian 
people” and he would not intervene with U.S. forces to bail out the Shah.86  
Carter’s sentiments signaled the death knell for the Iranian leader as he could no 
longer rely on the American umbrella to keep him safe.  As 1979 began, it was too 
late for Carter to distance the U.S. from Iran’s problems—the historical 
relationship between the two nations was too deep and his own words and actions 
had been too supportive of the Shah.  The Islamic movement led by Ayatollah 
Khomeini referenced the Shah’s closeness with America as a way of agitating the 
Iranian masses and bolstering the revolution.87  By the end of the next year, an 
Islamic Republic was solidly established in Tehran, and the Shah was receiving 
treating for his cancer in exile.   
The Shah had served as America’s greatest and most important ally in the 
region.  He had allowed the U.S. cheap and unrestricted access to Iran’s oil, and 
had presided over a long period of Middle East stability.  However, with the Shah 
out of power, America suddenly appeared vulnerable.  Following the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter was forced to institute 
the “Carter Doctrine” in his 1980 State of the Union address.  In it, he warned that 
“an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.”88  Carter’s early 
pronouncements were correct: the U.S. had entered a new period in history.  
However, it was not an era in which outdated Cold War ideologies would be 
replaced with new liberal foreign initiatives, such as human rights.  Instead, as 
historian Andrew Bacevich explains, the last two years of Carter’s presidency 
marked the beginning of a new effort on the part of American foreign policy 
makers to “guarantee the ever-increasing affluence” of American society, meaning 
the protection of America’s access to cheap Middle Eastern oil.89  Since the U.S. 
had lost their most reliable ally in the Middle East, American leaders felt 
compelled to forcefully defend its interests in the region in the years that followed.  
In the face of such momentous problems, it is easy to understand why Carter’s 
human rights policy in Iran has been misrepresented and even forgotten about. 
Carter’s human rights policy also failed in Iran because, much to his chagrin, it 
could not escape the boundaries or the ideologies of the Cold War.  As stated 
previously in this essay, Carter believed that America had entered a new phase in 
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foreign relations upon his election in 1976.  He believed that the traditional fight 
against Soviet communism had become outdated and unnecessarily taxing to the 
U.S., both in dollars and in American effort.  However, even before the fall of the 
Shah and the Carter Doctrine, Carter’s foreign policy in practice was still framed 
around the same concerns as his predecessors.  Carter’s promotion of human rights 
indirectly supported the “realpolitik” doctrine he sought to escape.  Although 
professing different rhetoric in public, Carter’s secret correspondence within his 
administration was littered with references to the Soviet threat and containing 
communism.  As Frank Ninkovich explains, “human rights, because they 
epitomized the enormous contrast between the ways of life created by the two 
ideologies, was also useful as a symbolic way of fighting the Cold War.”90  Since 
Carter practiced a foreign policy very similar to that of his Cold War predecessors, 
he could have framed human rights as a tool of fighting global communism.  But 
by insisting that his foreign policy and human rights initiatives existed outside of 
the Cold War, Carter confused foreign governments and alienated the very groups 
that a pro-human rights policy was best suited for.   Iran’s liberal opposition is a 
perfect example.  Carter could never bring himself to support Iran’s liberal 
nationalist movement as a successor regime, even though his human rights policy 
appeared to speak directly to what they were advocating for.  The leftist leanings of 
the liberal opposition and their supposed sympathies to communists could never be 
accepted by Carter or any American foreign policy maker.91  This was 
predetermined by traditional Cold War concerns, whether Carter acknowledged it 
or not.  Similarly, and following perfectly with the doctrine of “realpolitik,” Carter 
put aside his moralistic impulses in Iran because of the Soviet Union’s 
geographical proximity and the desire for regional stability.92  For the first twenty-
five years of the Cold War, the U.S. had formed a “special commitment” to the 
Middle East by supporting especially oppressive monarchies in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia.93  Carter was in no way ready for America to withdrawal its historic 
support from such oil-rich nations, even if their leaders blatantly continued to deny 
human rights.  Once again, Carter’s human rights policy was halted by Cold War 
realities and American interests.  In the last two years of his presidency, Carter 
would be forced to publicly embrace his failures and accept the continued 
existence of the Cold War.  The Carter Doctrine, which came on the heels of the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, put 
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Carter into the uncomfortable position of ratcheting up military spending and 
admitting that the Cold War had not yet reached a conclusion.94  
The result of this was a foreign policy and a president that appeared inconsistent 
and indecisive.  The great moral principles that had driven his entire life seemed 
lost in Carter’s last two years in office, as he was forced to go against his initial 
policy of human rights and reinvigorate the Cold War.  However, this does not 
mean his administration’s human rights policy was directed by empty idealism.  As 
biographer Peter Bourne states, “Carter was guided by a consistent set of values 
and beliefs” that remained with him for his entire life, including while he was 
president.95  Carter was not a political “flip-flopper,” nor did he hastily throw 
together different policies in hopes that something positive would result.96  Carter 
was a firm proponent of human rights and remains so to the present day.  His 
human rights policy has been much maligned and yet Carter has never regretted it; 
ideological consistency has never been his problem.  However, Carter ultimately 
fell short because, for over half of his presidency, he refused to acknowledge that 
he was a Cold War president.  Similarly, and for various reasons, Carter could not 
change course in his official Iranian policy, even as the Iranian revolution engulfed 
and destroyed the Shah’s regime.  His human rights policy appeared to give his 
administration a great opportunity to end America’s client relationship with Iran 
and to formulate a new Middle East policy for the post-Cold War world Carter 
envisioned.  However, Carter, like most other Cold War presidents, could not 
commit to the unknown and felt it was safer to continue the foreign policy already 
in place.  The fear of being responsible for losing Iran, what historian Frank 
Ninkovich would define as the fear of a “terrible failure,” moved Carter to 
continue America’s support for the anemic Shah.97  A regime change did 
eventually come to Iran, but it came in the form of a revolution that was 
unfavorable to the interests of the U.S.  Even amidst these outcomes, Carter stated 
in his memoirs that the effectiveness of his human rights policy should not always 
have been measured by “inches, pounds, or dollars”; better judgments of him were 
to be found in the “revival of hope” and the “lifting of the human spirit” in 
oppressed peoples.98  If this standard was universally applied, than Carter’s human 
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rights policy in Iran was, in part, a success.  Carter’s human rights policy did 
revive hope in Iran’s liberal opposition.  However, because of the Cold War and 
America’s historic relationship with the Shah, Carter could not follow their “hope” 
and “human spirit” for liberalization all the way through.  Thus, the failure of the 
United States in Iran became the failure of Jimmy Carter as well. 
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